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SIXTH AMENDMENT-APPLICABILITY
OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE
TO FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES
United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646
(1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Monsanto I and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States,2 the Supreme Court held both that the criminal forfei-
ture provisions of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO)3 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(CCE)4 statute did not exempt from criminal forfeiture assets a de-
fendant intends to use to pay attorneys' fees and that the forfeiture
of these assets is constitutional. These criminal forfeiture provi-
sions, 5 which are the same in both RICO and CCE, are known as the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act 6 and have been subject to much criti-
cism from both courts and scholars since enacted in 1984.
7
1 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
2 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Supp. V 1987).
4 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (Supp. V 1987) (CCE is a portion of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
5 Other than a forfeiture provision under the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. V 1987), which does not contain the relation-back provision, these
are the only criminal forfeiture laws currently in effect. See Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys'
Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 494
n.4 (1986). According to the legislative history of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act,
this is the first time criminal forfeiture has been allowed in the United States, S. REP. No.
225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182,
but Brickey cited an 1886 case concerning a statute which authorized criminal forfeit-
ures, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Brickey, supra.
6 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040 (1984).
7 United States v.Jones, 877 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (requiring applica-
tion of Caplin &Drysdale), rev'-837 F.2d 1332 (1988) (property exempt from forfeiture in
order to allow defendant to pay attorney); United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343 (1 Ith
Cir.) (forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not violate sixth amendment, and due process
does not require immediate post-restraint hearing), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 213, and 110
S. Ct. 146 (1989); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (attorney
fee forfeiture does not violate sixth amendment, but due process requires immediate
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Courts have referred to four key provisions in the Comprehen-
post-restraint adversary hearing when forfeiture affects defendant's ability to hire attor-
ney), rev g United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (statute allows
exemption of attorney fee from forfeiture), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989); United
States v. Weisman, 858 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1988) (forfeiture allowed because it did not
affect defendant's ability to hire counsel), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1353 (1989); United
States v. Unit No. 7 and Unit No. 8 of Shop in the Grove Condominium, 853 F.2d 1445
(8th Cir. 1988) (forfeiture violated fifth and sixth amendments, but court said decision
was only for narrow grounds in case), rev'd 890 F.2d 82 (1989) (en banc); United States
v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (attorneys' fees exempt from for-
feiture; court disagreed on reason for exemption), rev'k 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (sixth
amendment does not require exemption of attorneys' fees from forfeiture, but attor-
neys' fees cannot be forfeited unless trial court holds immediate post-restraint adversary
hearing), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989); United States v. Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (no constitutional right to release of forfeited assets to allow defendant to
retain private counsel on appeal); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1988) ("right to choice of counsel does not prohibit the government from re-
straining potentially forfeitable assets before trial"), rev' 654 F. Supp. 1541 (D. Utah
1987) (forfeiture of attorneys' fees is unconstitutional); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (that since forfei-
ture made defendants indigents, they had no constitutional right to counsel of choice),
rev'" United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987) (although Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act allows forfeiture of attorneys' fees, such forfeiture violates sixth amend-
ment), aff'g United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986) (Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act exempts attorneys' fees from forfeiture) and United States v.
Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Md. 1986) (no forfeiture of attorneys' fees because
"Congress did not intend the statute to encompass fees to attorneys"), aff'd, Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989); United States v. Thier, 801
F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986) (trial court must balance defendant's and government's inter-
ests in each case rather than categorically refusing to exempt assets from forfeiture);
United States v. Stein, 690 F. Supp. 767, 768 (E.D. Wis. 1988) ("no constitutional right
to retain an attorney with the illicit proceeds of a drug transaction"); United States v.
Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (court-appointed counsel may be paid from
assets subject to forfeiture); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(attorneys' fees exempt from forfeiture because Congress did not intend exemption of
attorneys' fees); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (attor-
neys' fees exempt from forfeiture because Congress did not intend exemption of attor-
neys' fees); In re GrandJury Subpoena DatedJan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14
(S.D.N.Y.) (no right to counsel of choice when defendant's money may actually belong
to government), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rog-
ers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985) (attorneys' fees exempt from forfeiture because
Congress did not intend exemption of attorneys' fees); Brickey, Attorneys' Fee Forfeitures:
On Defining "What" and "When" and Distinguishing "Ought from Is", 36 EMORY LJ. 761
(1987); Brickey, supra note 5; Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institu-
tional Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1 [hereinafter
Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees]; Cloud, Government Intrusions into the Attorney-Client
Relationship: The Impact of Fee Forfeitures on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of
Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY LJ. 817 (1987); Uelman, Converting Retained Lawyers into Ap-
pointed Lawyers: The Ethical and Tactical Implications, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1987);
Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice:
The Constitutional Dilemma and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 765 (1989); Comment,
Against Forfeiture of Attorneys" Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 124 (1986); Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defend-
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sive Forfeiture Act. The first defines what property is forfeitable.8
A person convicted under this Act must forfeit all assets involved in
performing the illegal acts and all assets which directly or indirectly
are derived from the proceeds of the illegal act.9
The second key provision, the relation-back clause, essentially
alters property rights. It provides that all the property subject to
forfeiture "vests in the United States upon the commission of the
act giving rise to forfeiture under this section."' 0 This provision is
at the root of constitutional considerations because it means that a
guilty defendant never had title in the assets he possessed. Of
course, the government cannot prove its title to the property until
the defendant is convicted. A third party can contest this transfer
only if that party can prove that he/she is "a bona fide purchaser for
value of such property who at the time of the purchase was reason-
ably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture." I
The third important provision is an explanation of the proper
procedure for a bona fide purchaser to follow to establish his/her
ants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys "' with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 663 (1987).
8 21 U.S.C. § 853(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). The statute states:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter... punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any
provision of State law-(l) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds
the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; (2) any of
the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to com-
mit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; and (3) in the case of a person
convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of section 848
of this title, the person shall forfeit, in addition to any property described in para-
graph (1) or (2), any of his interest in, claims against, and property or contractual
rights affording a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any
other sentence imposed pursuant to this subchapter ... that the person forfeit to
the United States all property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine other-
wise authorized by this part, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from
an offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) is the same in all relevant respects).
9 Note, supra note 7, at 667.
10 21 U.S.C. § 853(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c). The section states:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section
vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture
under this section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person
other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and
thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee es-
tablishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this sec-
tion; the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its
determination.
21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) is the same in all relevant respects).
11 Id.
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right to property subject to forfeiture.1 2 This provision stresses that
a bona fide purchaser is any person who is "at the time of purchase
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture under this section."'
3
The fourth significant section describes the process for ob-
taining a restraining order so that the government may "preserve
the availability of property."1 4 This subsection has been used as a
means of limiting the meaning of the general terms of the section
defining what property is forfeitable.1 5
According to the legislative history, Congress enacted the Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act because it recognized that drug dealers
and racketeers commit their crimes with the expectation of making
enormous profits.16 The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act is intended
1) "to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal
forfeiture, and, in those cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or
conceal his property, to assure that he cannot as a result avoid the
economic impact of forfeiture"' 7 and 2) "to strip these offenders
and organizations of their economic power."' 8
12 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1)(6); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). The statute states:
If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that-(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or
interest in the property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfei-
ture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the
petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of
the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfei-
ture of the property under this section; or (B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser
for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of
purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfei-
ture under this section.
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) (18 U.S.C. § 1963(1)(6) is the same in all relevant respects).
13 18 U.S.C. § 1963(1)(6)(B); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B).
14 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1). The section states:
Upon application of the United States, the court may enter a restraining order or
injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any
other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of
this section for forfeiture under this section-(A) upon the filing of an indictment or
information charging a violation of this subchapter ... for which criminal forfeiture
may be ordered under this section and alleging that the property with respect to
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section ....
21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2) is the same in all relevant respects).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 58-60, 85-90; United States v. Monsanto, 852
F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
16 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3182.
17 Id. at 196.




A. CAPLIN & DRYSDALE
Prior to 1985, Christopher Reckmeyer retained the law firm of
Caplin & Drysdale to represent him in an ongoing grand jury inves-
tigation.1 9 In January 1985, Reckmeyer was indicted for running a
massive drug importation and distribution scheme, and the indict-
ment sought forfeiture of specified assets in Reckmeyer's posses-
sion.20 When Reckmeyer was indicted, the district court entered a
restraining order preventing Reckmeyer from transferring any as-
sets potentially subject to forfeiture. 2' Nonetheless, shortly after
the indictment was handed down, Caplin & Drysdale collected fees
for the legal service it had already rendered.
22
Reckmeyer moved that the restraining order be modified so
that he could use restrained assets to pay legal fees. 23 Before the
court held a hearing on Reckmeyer's motion, however, Reckmeyer
entered into a plea agreement and agreed to forfeit all assets listed
in the indictment.2 4 The court decided that the plea agreement
made Reckmeyer's motion to modify the restraining order irrele-
vant, and Reckmeyer forfeited virtually all assets in his possession. 25
Caplin & Drysdale, which had continued to represent Reck-
meyer, filed a petition as a third party which had entered a bona fide
transaction with Reckmeyer and claimed $170,000 in legal fees in
addition to the fees it had previously obtained. 26 Caplin & Drysdale
also argued that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act did not allow
forfeiture of attorney's fees and that if it did, then the statute would
be unconstitutional. 27 The district court held that the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act exempted assets intended to pay attorneys' fees
from forfeiture. 28 A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court decision, although its decision was based on constitutional
rather than statutory grounds.2 9 The Fourth Circuit then agreed to
19 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2649 (1989).
20 Id. (indictment of forfeiture was under CCE).
21 Id.






28 Id.; United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986).
29 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2650; United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1987).
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hear the case en banc and reversed the decision of the panel.30 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari "to determine whether the fed-
eral drug forfeiture statute includes an exemption for assets that a
defendant wishes to use to pay an attorney who conducted his de-
fense in the criminal case where forfeiture was sought" and if there
is no exemption, "whether the statute, so interpreted, is consistent
with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 3 1
B. MONSANTO
Monsanto3 2 presented the same issue presented by Caplin &
Drysdale, but the procedural stance was different. Monsanto was in-
dicted inJuly 1987 for directing a large-scale heroin distribution en-
terprise.33 The indictment listed CCE counts and specified three
assets subject to forfeiture pursuant to CCE: a house, an apartment,
and $35,000.34 The same day the indictment was unsealed the court
granted the government's motion for a restraining order freezing
the assets mentioned in the indictment.3 5 Monsanto moved to va-
cate the restraining order so he could use the assets to pay attor-
ney's fees and also moved for a declaration that assets used to pay
attorney's fees would not be forfeited upon conviction. 36 The dis-
trict court held that only assets sufficient to pay an attorney the
wages specified under the Criminal Justice Act 37 could be exempted
from the restraining order for attorneys' fees.38 On appeal, a Sec-
ond Circuit panel decided that neither the language of the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act nor the sixth amendment required that
attorneys' fees be exempted from forfeiture, but the court re-
manded the case for an adversarial hearing at which the government
would be required to prove that the assets likely were forfeitable. 39
The court held that if the government failed to prove likelihood of
forfeiture at an initial hearing of this sort, it could not subject assets
intended to pay attorneys' fees to forfeiture upon defendant's
conviction. 4
0
30 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2650; In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
31 Caplin &Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2649.
32 United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
33 Id. at 2659.
34 Id. at 2659-60.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982).
38 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661; Brief for Respondent at 4 - 5, Monsanto (No. 88-454).
39 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661; United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74, 84 (1987).
40 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661; Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 84.
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Pursuant to the directions of the appellate court, the district
court held a hearing on the likelihood of forfeiture and decided to
continue the restraining order.4 I The case then proceeded to trial,
and Monsanto was represented by appointed counsel. 42 During the
trial, the Second Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the
decision of the panel, requiring modification of the restraining or-
der so restrained assets could be used to pay attorneys' fees.43 The
rationale of the court was not clear because the court was divided
among eight opinions: 44 three judges claimed the statute violated
the sixth amendment; 45 three judges claimed the statutory language
required an exemption of attorneys' fees from forfeiture;46 two
other judges concurred in part and argued that the statute violated
the due process clause. 47 The other four judges, for varying rea-
sons, accepted forfeiture of attorneys' fees according to both the
language of the statute and the Constitution. 48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether
the federal drug forfeiture statute authorizes a District Court to
enter a pretrial order freezing assets in a defendant's possession,
even where the defendant seeks to use those assets to pay an attor-
ney; [and] if so, . . . whether such an order is permissible under the
41 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661.
42 Id.
43 Id.; United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988). A few days after the
Second Circuit decided forfeiture of attorneys' fees was improper, Monsanto moved for
a mistrial because his right to retain counsel had been violated. Brief for Respondent, at
10, Monsanto (No. 88-454). The district court denied the motion and simply gave him
the opportunity to obtain counsel in the midst of summations, which, as the court recog-
nized, was not plausible. Id. At the conclusion of the trial, Monsanto was convicted and
his assets were forfeited. Id. The Supreme Court said that none of these proceedings
made the issue of the pretrial restraining order moot. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661 n.4.
44 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2661; Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1400.
45 ChiefJudge Feinberg wrote an opinion in which Judges Oakes and Kearsejoined.
Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402-04. Judge Oakes also wrote a separate opinion to emphasize
the interest of the entire criminal justice system in recognizing the sixth amendment
right to counsel in this case. Id. at 1404-05.
46 Judge Winter wrote an opinion in whichJudges Miskill and Newman joined. Id. at
1405-11.
47 Judge Miner wrote an opinion, in which Judge Altimarijoined, and explained that
Congress, not the courts, must decide whether an immediate post-restraint hearing
would remedy the unconstitutionality of the statute; the courts can only decide whether
the statute is constitutional. Id. at 1411-12. Judge Miner would have held that pre-trial
restraint of assets intended to pay an attorney was unconstitutional without reaching the
question of whether post-trial forfeiture of attorneys' fees was allowed. Id.
48 Id. at 1412-20. Each dissenting judge wrote his own opinion. The opinions
ranged from supporting the panel decision to claiming it was unnecessary to reach the
question of when assets could be seized after trial, to claiming that forfeiture was always
acceptable and there was not need to change the statute.
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Constitution. ' 4 9
III. OPINIONS
A. MONSANTO MAJORITY
The Court, somewhat arbitrarily, used Monsanto to discuss the
statutory aspects of the issue and Caplin & Drysdale to discuss the
constitutional claims. 50 Justice White wrote the opinion for the
Court in both cases.
In Monsanto, Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia, discounted two
methods which had been used by lower courts to find an exemption
to attorneys' fees within the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. The
first method depended on finding an ambiguity within the statute
which required the courts to apply the canon of statutory interpreta-
tion that courts should "construe statutes to avoid decision as to
their constitutionality."-5' Monsanto argued that the failure to con-
sider the treatment of attorneys' fees created ambiguity; since the
legislative history indicates Congress did not even consider attorney
fee forfeiture, the Court could imply that had Congress considered
the issue, Congress would have exempted attorneys' fees from
forfeiture. 5
2
Justice White rejected this method. Section 853(a) requires for-
feiture of "any property" that fits into the broad definition of prop-
erty given in section 853(b).53 The statute contains no language
that singles lawyers out for special treatment.54 Given this language
and the fact that every court of appeals which had considered the
question unanimously noted insufficient ambiguity in the statute to
justify exempting attorneys' fees from forfeiture, Justice White de-
cided there is no reason to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture. 55
49 United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2659 (1989).
50 The Court did address one constitutional claim in Monsanto; the Court concluded
that the due process clause does not prohibit courts from freezing the defendant's assets
before he/she has been convicted if the court has probable cause to believe the assets
are forfeitable. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2666. Justice White explained that since courts
can restrain persons upon a showing of probable cause that they have committed a
crime, courts must be able to restrain property upon a similar showing. Id. The Court
reserved the question of whether an adversary hearing is necessary in order for courts to
impose a pretrial restraining order on the defendant. Id. at 2666 n.10.
5' Id. at 2664 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Con-
str. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440
U.S. 490, 500 (1979)).






Furthermore, Monsanto's argument was unconvincing because
the lack of any specific provisions in the legislative history56 demon-
strates breadth rather than ambiguity: "Congress' failure to supple-
ment section 853(a)'s comprehensive phrase-'any property'-with
an exclamatory 'and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attor-
ney' does not lessen the force of the statute's plain language.
'57
The second method of exempting attorneys' fees from forfei-
ture is the method developed by Judge Winter in the Second Cir-
cuit's en banc decision in Monsanto.58 Judge Winter focused on the
section describing pretrial restraining orders. 59 This section pro-
vides that a court "may enter" a restraining order, andJudge Winter
contended that since the statute says "may" rather than "shall,"
courts must apply equitable principles, which favor defendants,
before granting the restraining order. Once a district court decides
a defendant may use his/her funds to pay his/her attorney, the
money will never be forfeited because the statute requires the same
discretionary standard for seizing money from third parties that it
does for restraining assets. 60
Justice White rejected this interpretation for three reasons.
First, he found no indication that the general forfeiture provisions
applicable to "any property" should be limited by instructions on
when the court may grant a restraining order.6' Second, instead of
giving the courts "equitable discretion," Judge Winter's interpreta-
tion requires courts to exempt attorneys' fees from forfeiture, and
given the strong language of other parts of the Comprehensive For-
56 The legislative history does say, "Nothing in this section is intended to interfere
with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel." H. R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 199 n.1 (1984). But this is an ambiguous passage which is too inconclu-
sive to give much support to either side. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2663 & n.8. Further-
more, Justice White believed that the legislative history contained material which
supported allowing forfeiture of attorneys' fees. Id. In explaining why it was necessary
to change the forfeiture provisions originally included in RICO, the House Judiciary
Committee referred to a case in which the aims of forfeiture had been frustrated because
the government wanted forfeiture of $750,000 worth of assets, but collected only
$16,000 because, among other reasons, $559,000 was used to pay attorneys' fees. H. R.
REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 3 (1984) (citing United States v. Meinster,
475 F. Supp. 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1979), aft'd, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1136 (1982)).
57 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985)).
58 United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (2d Cir. 1988) (Winter, J.,
concurring).
59 Id. at 1405-06 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A)).
60 Id. at 1410 (citing § 853(c) which says, "property that is subsequently transferred
to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture"
(emphasis added by court)).
61 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
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feiture Act, such a command should not be implied. 62 Third, the
legislative history states, "The sole purpose of [section 853's] re-
straining order provision ... is to preserve the status quo, i.e., to
assure the availability of the property pending disposition of the
criminal case," 63 and Judge Winter's interpretation bears no rela-
tion to this objective.64
B. CAPLIN & DRYSDALE MAJORITY
In Caplin & Drysdale,65 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia, explained
that neither the fifth amendment nor the sixth amendment requires
exemption of attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Caplin & Drysdale
based its sixth amendment claim on the right of a defendant to
choose his own counsel. The Court decided, however, that since
impecunious defendants do not enjoy a right to counsel of choice,
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act is constitutional.66 As long as the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act does not force defendants to pro-
ceed without any counsel at all, the Act takes away no sixth amend-
ment rights and "[t]he burden placed on defendants by the
forfeiture law is ... a limited one." 6
7
Justice White compared a defendant subject to forfeiture to a
bank robber who wants to use money he has stolen from a bank to
retain counsel.68 Just as taking funds from the bank robbery would
be improper because the funds rightfully belong to the bank, a de-
fendant may not use assets that belong to the government to pay his
attorney.
69
Caplin & Drysdale had argued that the bank robber analogy is
not conclusive because the property right created by the relation-
back clause is different than the property right a bank has in funds
stolen from it. Justice White held, however, that the property right
created by the relation-back clause is much stronger than Caplin &
Drysdale claimed because "this approach, known as the 'taint the-
ory,' is one that 'has long been recognized in forfeiture cases.' "70
62 Id.
63 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 204, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182.
64 Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665.
65 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
66 Id. at 2652 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Laska v. United States, 82 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir. 1936)).




Furthermore, Justice White explained that it is illogical to con-
tend that the relation-back provision is invalid with regard to attor-
neys' fees but that the defendant has no right to use assets subject to
forfeiture to exercise any other constitutionally protected right,
such as the right to speak. 71 Just as the Court would not distinguish
between different types of property rights, it refused to create a
"distinction between, or hierarchy among, constitutional rights."
7 2
Justice White also applied a "balancing analysis" to the situa-
tion, although under his analysis it was unnecessary to take this
step. 73 Caplin & Drysdale argued that the balance favored the de-
fendant because the government's only interest was in "dispossess-
ing a drug dealer or racketeer of the proceeds of his wrong-doing,"
and that was accomplished whether the money went to the govern-
ment or to the defendant's lawyer. 74 Justice White recognized three
other reasons for forfeiture which tilt the balance in favor of the
government.
First, "the Government has a pecuniary interest in forfeiture
that goes beyond merely separating a criminal from his ill-gotten
gains; that legitimate interest extends to recovering all forfeitable
assets, for such assets are deposited in a Fund that supports law-
enforcement efforts in a variety of important and useful ways."
75
Second, the government has an interest in "returning property, in
full, to those wrongfully deprived or defrauded of it. ' '76 This is the
same interest which makes it illegal for bank robbers to retain law-
yers with money stolen from a bank.
77
Third, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act to
"lessen the economic power of organized crime and drug enter-
prises," and "[t]his includes the use of such economic power to re-
tain private counsel." 78 Justice White recognized that this interest is
unsettling:
As soon [as the possessor of the forfeitable asset committed the violation] of the
internal revenue laws, the forfeiture under those laws took effect, and (though need-
ingjudicial condemnation to perfect it) operated from that time as a statutory con-
veyance to the United States of all the right, title, and interest then remaining in the
[possessor]; and was as valid and effectual, against all the world, as a recorded deed.
The right so vested in the United States could not be defeated or impaired by any
subsequent dealings of the . . . [possessor].
Stowell, 133 U.S. at 19.
71 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653-54.
72 Id. at 2654.
73 Id.




78 Id. at 2654-55.
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[W]hen a defendant claims that he has suffered some substantial im-
pairment of his Sixth Amendment rights by virtue of the seizure or
forfeiture of assets in his possession, such a complaint is no more than
the reflection of the "harsh reality that the quality of a criminal de-
fendant's representation frequently may turn on his ability to retain
the best counsel money can buy."
'79
Justice White concluded his balancing analysis by stating that the
result is necessary to avoid encountering "interference with a de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment rights whenever the government
freezes or takes some property in a defendant's possession before,
during or after a criminal trial."80
The Court also rejected the fifth amendment claim that the
Comprehensive Forfeiture act causes an imbalance of power. The
fifth amendment claim essentially is that the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act gives the prosecution too much control over who the de-
fense counsel will be because the prosecution can threaten
forfeiture when it is not content with a defendant's choice of
counsel.
The fifth amendment argument added virtually nothing to the
sixth amendment argument because the sixth amendment defines
the elements which bring due process to a criminal trial.8 ' Further-
more, the Court will not invalidate a statute merely because it could
be used unjustly. If there ever is a situation in which a prosecutor
manipulates defense counsel with the threat of forfeiture, a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct would solve the injustice; a declaration
that the statute is facially unconstitutional is unnecessary.8 2
C. DISSENT
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, dissented from the decisions of the Court.83 Justice Black-
mun wrote that there is "one core insight" which compelled the dis-
sent: "that it is unseemly and unjust for the Government to beggar
those it prosecutes in order to disable their defense at trial." 84
In response to the Court's holding that the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act contains no ambiguities that make it possible to inter-
79 Id. at 2655 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in result)).
80 Id. Justice White supported this argument by referring to jeopardy tax assess-
ments-seizures by the IRS which ensure payment of potential tax liabilities-which cir-
cuit courts have upheld as constitutional. Id.
81 Id. at 2556.
82 Id. at 2657.
83 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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pret the statute as exempting attorneys' fees, Justice Blackmun
adopted Judge Winter's argument8 5 and argued that silence as to
the issue of attorneys' fees creates sufficient ambiguity to justify in-
voking the canon of statutory interpretation that statutes should be
interpreted to avoid constitutional problems.8 6 The majority erro-
neously focused on section 853(a), which states that property in the
defendant's possession must be forfeited.8 7 The relevant section is
section 853(c), which states that property in the possession of third
parties "may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture,"88 giv-
ing courts discretion to determine how to treat property possessed
by third parties. Furthermore, section 853(e)(1) allows courts dis-
cretion in determining whether to grant post-indictment protective
orders.89 In exercising their discretion, courts may consider the in-
terests of third parties, and, therefore, "the Government does not
have an absolute right to an order preserving the availability of
property by barring its transfer to third parties."90
Since proving that a judge may exercise discretion does not
prove that this discretion will lead to the exemption of attorneys'
fees, Justice Blackmun next proved that balancing the interests of
the parties necessitates exemption. The majority failed to recognize
this result because it took "an overly broad view of the Act's pur-
poses."91 In Monsanto,92 the Court claimed that "the Act aims to
preserve the availability of all potentially forfeitable property during
the pre-conviction period, and to achieve the forfeiture of all such
property upon conviction. '95 Congress' purpose, however, was not
to raise as much revenue as possible but "to prevent the profits of
criminal activity from being poured into future such activity." 9 4
Congress also desired forfeiture of all assets purchased with the
fruit of crime in order to prevent illegal dealings from becoming too
lucrative to be deterred.9 5 Finally, Congress needed to allow forfei-
ture from third parties to prevent those convicted of crimes from
85 For a description of this argument, see supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (WinterJ., concurring).
86 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
91 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92 United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
93 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (citing Mlonsanto, 109 S. Ct. at 2665).
94 Id. at 2670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182).
95 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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hiding their assets by transferring them to others only until they got
out ofjail.96 Given these purposes, courts can freely exempt attor-
neys' fees from forfeiture. In fact, Justice Blackmun contended that
given this alternative, district courts will never refuse to exempt at-
torneys' fees.9
7
Justice Blackmun continued by claiming that even though the
Court did not accept a statutory interpretation exempting attorneys'
fees, it should have required an exemption of attorneys' fees
from forfeiture because the sixth amendment requires exemption. 98
The majority analyzed the sixth amendment issue improperly be-
cause it did not consider the extent or function of the right to coun-
sel of choice, a much more substantial right than the majority
acknowledged. 99
According to Justice Blackmun:
The right to retain private counsel serves to foster the trust between
attorney and client that is necessary for the attorney to be a truly effec-
tive advocate .... [T]he defendant's perception of the fairness of the
process, and his willingness to acquiesce in its results, depend upon
his confidence in his counsel's dedication, loyalty, and ability. When
the Government insists upon the right to choose the defendant's coun-
sel for him, that relationship of trust is undermined: counsel is too
readily perceived as the Government's agent rather than his own.' 00
Defendants have a "right to privately chosen and compensated
counsel" because private counsel is far superior to appointed
counsel. 0
This right to private counsel is important not only to the indi-
vidual defendant but to the integrity of the criminal justice
system:1 02
There is a place in our system of criminal justice for the maverick and
the risk-taker, for approaches that might not fit into the structured en-
vironment of a public defender's office, or that might displease ajudge
whose preference for non-confrontational styles of advocacy might in-
fluence the judge's appointment decisions. There is also a place for
the employment of "specialized defense counsel" for technical and
complex cases. The choice of counsel is the primary means for the
defendant to establish the kind of defense he will put forward.' 0 3
96 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 2671 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 2672-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
101 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Without the defendant's right to retain private
counsel, the Government too readily could defeat its adversaries simply by outspending
them.").
102 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 2674 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Justice Blackmun argued that four main conflicts will arise as a
result of the majority's decision. First, the defendant will distrust
any appointed counsel and will view the forfeiture as a means of
preventing him/her from putting forth an adequate defense. 0 4 The
public defender's office will be able to do little to counteract this
view because appointed counsel will most likely be inexperienced,
and trials in which forfeiture is involved will be costly and difficult
for public defender offices to manage with their scarce resources. 0 5
Second, any private lawyer who is willing to represent a forfei-
ture defendant will be faced with a conflict of interest forbidden by
ethical norms because he/she will in effect be working on a contin-
gent fee basis. The lawyer may want to enter into a plea agreement
which is not in the best interests of the client simply because it
waives forfeiture and enables the lawyer to collect a fee. 10 6
Third, the government will be able "to exercise an intolerable
degree of power over any private attorney who takes on the task of
representing a defendant in a forfeiture case."' 1 7 The prosecution
may seek a forfeiture count in the indictment simply to avoid facing
a certain lawyer who is very talented. 10 8
Finally, lawyers will no longer be willing to join the criminal-
defense bar. Lawyers willing to practice in an area where fees are
never certain must be either very idealistic or very incompetent. 0 9
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the majority correctly
stated that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute, but "never
before . . . has the Court suggested that the Government's naked
desire to deprive a defendant of 'the best counsel money can buy,' is
itself a legitimate government interest that can justify the Govern-
ment's interference with the defendant's right to chosen counsel-
and for good reason."' 10 Since this is the only strong claim the ma-
jority included in its balancing analysis and it is illegitimate, the bal-
ancing analysis must come out in favor of the defendants."II
The majority failed to balance the right to counsel of choice
104 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 2675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The other two claims in the government's favor
presented by the majority were the need to raise money to fight crime and the need to
return property to innocent third parties. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77. Ar-
guably, the first interest has some strength but Justice Blackmun rejected it as a real
interest of government earlier in his opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
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correctly because it depended on circular logic to reach its conclu-
sion: the relation-back clause gives the government a paramount
interest in the defendant's assets because the relation-back clause
gives the government title to the assets.1 12 Justice Blackmun re-
jected this argument because as he reads the statute, the govern-
ment has no right in the property until after the defendant is
convicted. 13
Justice Blackmun also distinguished the analogies that Justice
White and other courts have used. The forfeiture defendant is un-
like the bank robber because the bank robber never had title in the
assets; he merely had possession of them for a short time. 1 4 Civil
forfeiture cases are distinguishable because they involve forfeiture
of contraband which the law recognizes no right for anyone to pos-
sess. 115 Jeopardy assessment cases are distinguishable because the
government's claim arises prior to conviction and because most of
the difficulties arise in civil court where there is no right to
counsel.116
The probable cause showing necessary to obtain a restraining
order does not help matters at all because defendants will have
trouble retaining counsel at stages long before the indictment if
there is any indication that the client could at some point be subject
to forfeiture." 17
IV. ANALYSIS
In Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto, the Court decided that
neither the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act nor the sixth amendment
gives a rapidly growing class of defendants 1 8 any protection against
forfeiture of attorneys' fees; since upon conviction the government
may be able to prove title in the assets dating back to the time of the
crime, the defendant cannot use the assets to help contest the gov-
ernment's claim to the assets. The Court's evaluation of the statute
is justifiable, but its constitutional analysis is weak. Although the
view presented by the Court has logical appeal, there are some gaps
112 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1'3 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 2676 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("[T]he IRS ... has a legal claim to the sums at issue
at the time of the assessment, based upon substantive provisions of the Code.").
117 Id. at 2677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118 Several recent articles have recognized that the threat of forfeiture is so wide-
spread that lawyers are feeling the effect and leaving criminal law practice. See, e.g.,
Fricker, Dirty Money, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 60; Drug War Spotlight Is on Legal Fees Issue,
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29, 1989, § 1, at 21, col. 5.
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in the logic which deserve consideration because of the potentially
devastating effect of the statutes. 119 This Note will explain briefly
the reasons for preferring the majority's analysis of the statute to
the dissent's and then will present a thorough analysis of the consti-
tutional arguments revealing the gaps in the Court's argument and
showing that the Court erroneously categorized forfeiture defend-
ants as indigents for purposes of the right to counsel of choice.
A. INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act provides a fascinating view
of statutory interpretation. The Court split along the same lines for
both the statutory and constitutional questions, indicating that the
justices formed their views on the constitutionality of the statute
before they decided how to interpret it.120 Some lower courts took
this approach to the extreme and altered the legislative history to
support the view that Congress, recognizing the constitutional
problems presented by forfeiture of attorneys' fees, intended to ex-
empt them from forfeiture.
121
In Monsanto, both statutory arguments were compelling, but the
majority correctly determined that the language of the statute and
the intent of Congress taken together do not provide for an exemp-
tion of attorneys' fees from forfeiture. There is no reason to expand
on the majority's analysis here 122 other than to point out that the
statute was not quite as clear as Justice White indicated it was. It is
not altogether impossible to read an exemption into the statute, but
119 For a discussion of this effect, see Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2674-76 (Black-
mun,J., dissenting); Cloud, Foofeiting Defense Attorneys'Fees,supra note 7, at 33-65; Winick,
supra note 7, at 772-84.
120 It would be interesting to use this statute to examine many different theories of
statutory interpretation, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of the Note.
121 In United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) (quoting S.
REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 3182), the court inserted the word "only" into the legislative history: "'The
provision should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as nominees of
the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions.'"
Although the court had some reason to believe that Congress intended the statement to
have the meaning the court gave it by adding the word "only," this addition made it easy
to justify exempting attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Several other courts followed Rogers
and based exemption on the altered version of legislative history. See United States v.
Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. laniello, 644 F. Supp. 452
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Ap-
pellate courts rejected this reformation of the legislative history and, as the Court stated
in Monsanto, Judge Winter and the two judges joining his opinion were the only appel-
late court judges to believe that the statute could be read as exempting attorneys' fees.
United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2662 (1989).
122 For a description of the analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
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doing so is neither the most straightforward means of reading the
statute, nor is there any indication that Congress intended any ex-
emption. The ambiguity is sufficient that a broad adoption of the
canon of statutory construction-that statutes should be interpreted
to avoid constitutional problems-could justify reading an exemp-
tion into the statute. However, as Judge Posner explained, this ca-
non causes courts "to enlarge the already vast reach of
constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagent mod-
em interpretation of the Constitution-to create a judge-made con-
stitutional 'penumbra' that has much the same prohibitory effect as
the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself."1 2
3
Judge Winter's argument does not present sufficient ambiguity
because he relied on small aspects of procedural sections, and his
interpretation does not absolutely prohibit exemption of attorneys'
fees from forfeiture. 124 Dependence on ajudge's equitable powers
will not ensure that attorneys' fees will not be subject to forfei-
ture.' 25 When a judge balances the defendant's and the govern-
ment's interests, he/she will have to consider that the purpose of
the restraining order is " 'to assure the availability of the property
pending disposition of the criminal case.' "126 A judge may con-
clude that "the rather massive financial outlays often necessary to
pay private defense counsel in RICO and CCE prosecutions" should
be forfeited.' 27 Justice Blackmun "find[s] it exceedingly unlikely
that a district court, instructed that it had the discretion to permit a
defendant to retain counsel, would ever choose not to do so," 128 but
since Justice Blackmun seems to rely only on an ipse dixit which is not
wholly convincing.
These shortcomings might be acceptable had something in the
statute expressed any concern for lawyers fees or even had the legis-
lative history contained a few clear statements on attorneys' fees.
However, when a somewhat unsatisfactory answer is obtained by
pulling one word out of a long statute it is absurd to base an entire
case on that construction. If courts were always allowed to interpret
123 Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 800, 816 (1983).
124 For a description ofJudge Winter's argument, see supra text accompanying notes
58-60, 85-90.
125 United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1414 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Maho-
ney, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Mahoney, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 204,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182).
127 Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1414 (Mahoney, J., dissenting).




statutes in this manner Congress could become meaningless; courts
could uncover almost any position they desired to discover in
statutes.
29
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Because the statute does not exempt attorneys' fees from forfei-
ture the Court had to consider the sixth amendment issue.'3 0 The
Court reached its decision by claiming that defendants subject to
forfeiture are indigent and that indigent defendants do not have a
right to counsel of choice.' 3 ' The Court, however, did not consider
that there may be good reasons for treating forfeiture defendants
differently than other indigents and that there are subtle but very
significant differences between indigence caused by forfeiture and
indigence from other causes. Of course, merely proving that differ-
ent considerations apply to indigents does not render the Court's
decision incorrect, because the right to counsel of choice is not an
absolute right.' 3 2 Application of the right requires balancing the
needs of the defendant and of the government. The Court at-
tempted to show how these needs balanced out, but the Court's bal-
ancing was poor. The Court gave little consideration to how much
weight to give the right to counsel of choice but used considerable
imagination to create government interests.' 33
129 In an article which argues that the canons of interpretation are "wrong," Judge
Posner said, "The judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the
enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the
case at bar." Posner, supra note 123, at 817. Posner listed the things he believes it is
appropriate for judges to consider. First, they must look at the "usual things": "the
language and apparent purpose of the statute, its background and structure, its legisla-
tive history .... and the bearing of related statutes." Id. at 818. However, courts should
also carefully consider "the values and attitudes, so far as they are known today, of the
period in which the legislation was enacted," and "any sign of legislative intent regard-
ing the freedom with which he should exercise his interpretive function." Id. The only
one of these factors which clearly supports Judge Winter's interpretation is the structure
of the statute because Congress does seem to detract from the all-encompassing view of
§ 853(a) in sections which describe the actual operation of forfeiture.
130 The Court also considered the fifth amendment issue of whether forfeiture of at-
torneys' fees violates the due process clause by creating an imbalance of power. Caplin
&Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2656. As the Court explained, this analysis cannot be separated
from the sixth amendment issue. Id. If a defendant has counsel that is adequate under
the sixth amendment, there is, by definition, no unconstitutional imbalance of power
adequate to make forfeiture statutes facially unconstitutional. If a prosecutor takes im-
proper advantage of the power the forfeiture statutes give him/her, prosecutorial mis-
conduct claims should remedy the wrong. Id. at 2657.
131 Id. at 2652-53 (since relation-back clause is valid, a forfeiture defendant has no
right to any assets).
132 See infra note 135.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 75-80; Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654-55.
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Thus, two aspects of the Court's analysis require close consid-
eration: 1) the holding that forfeiture defendants are indigents in-
distinguishable from any other indigent and 2) the holding that a
balancing analysis favors the government. This Note will examine
each of these holdings and prove that the Court should have found
forfeiture of attorneys' fees to be unconstitutional.
1. The Rights of Indigents
The Supreme Court's assumption that forfeiture defendants
should be treated like other indigents is appealing because it is eas-
ier to be sympathetic with the bank robber who has spent his life in
abject poverty and robs a bank in order to provide his family with
food and shelter than with drug kingpins and mobsters. Nonethe-
less, our ability to entertain more sympathy for some stereotypes
than for others is not and should not be the source of constitutional
law.13 4
Justice White erred because, although indigents do not have a
right to counsel of choice,13 5 there is no reason to categorize forfei-
ture defendants as indigents and force them to enjoy lesser rights
unless there is a clear justification for doing so. Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act defendants are distinguishable from other indigents
only if differences between the groups would either cause forfeiture-
defendants to be deprived of more rights than other indigents or
make granting forfeiture defendants the right to counsel of choice
134 Furthermore, forfeiture is not necessarily limited to drug kingpins and racketeers:
"The same analysis that today permits a pretrial seizure and then a forfeiture of the
property of drug dealers may be applied tomorrow to anyone who violates federal anti-
trust laws or laws prohibiting polluting the water or the air." United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485, 1509 (10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J., dissenting).
135 When an indigent client attempts to assert his/her right to counsel of choice,
courts do not even give the defendant a choice between two potential appointed attor-
neys. W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(a) (1984). Courts must focus
on different interests depending on whether counsel is retained or appointed: "In rela-
tion to indigent criminal defendants, the Sixth Amendment seeks not to maximize free
choice of counsel but to prevent anyone from being unjustly convicted or illegally sen-
tenced." United States v. Ely, 719 F.2d 902, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1037 (1984). In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983), the Supreme Court seemed to
support the same principle when it refused to grant indigents a right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship. A common justification for this practice is that "indigent
defendants cannot be allowed to paralyze the system by all flocking to one lawyer." Ely,
719 F.2d at 905. The appointment of counsel would not work as efficiently if the right to
counsel of choice were respected. W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra, § 11.4(a). This treatise
lists three justifications for not allowing indigents the right to counsel of choice:
1) judges can pick attorneys better than indigents because judges are more familiar with
the lawyers abilities, 2) attorneys with a good reputation would receive a disproportion-
ate number of cases, and repeat offenders would be most likely to get the best lawyers,
and 3) no defendant has a right to be represented by the best counsel. Id.
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more efficient than it would be with other indigents. Forfeiture de-
fendants must be compared to two groups: 1) people who have
never had any money or any capacity to retain an attorney and 2)
people forced to give up their money to the government in situa-
tions other than criminal forfeiture cases.
There is a significant difference in regard to ownership of assets
between people who have never had access to money and people
whose indigence is caused by the relation-back clause. In United
States v. Nichols,13 6 the court recognized, "The problem raised by the
relation back provision is that while title shifts upon the occurrence
of the illegal act, the determination that the defendant committed a
crime and that the designated assets are linked to that crime is not
made until after trial. The government's title is established by the
judgment."' 137 Thus, forfeiture defendants have assets with which
they could pay an attorney, but there is a dispute over who owns the
assets which prevents the defendant from having access to them at
the time when they are most crucial to the defendant's exercise of
the right to counsel.
The presence of funds potentially belonging to forfeiture de-
fendants is especially significant in setting them apart from indi-
gents who cannot even contend to have funds because criminal
defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. 138 Although the
Supreme Court did not consider this presumption at all, and some
circuits courts have claimed that a court is not violating a presump-
tion of innocence when it "act[s] in a manner that adversely affects a
criminal defendant before trial when it is necessary to protect an
important public interest,"' 139 the fact that forfeiture defendants
have this claim, while other indigents do not, sets forfeiture defend-
ants apart.
Forfeiture defendants, unlike other indigents, can point to
money at the time of trial that may be their money. Although other
indigents may be subject to pretrial deprivation of liberty or bail
requirements,140 these are unlike forfeiture because they have virtu-
136 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
137 Id. at 1498.
138 Note, supra note 7, at 686:
The criminal justice system has a tradition of favoring the defendant in order to
avoid conviction of the innocent. It would be unjust to prevent a person from using
the assets in his possession to retain the counsel of his choice and then find him
guilty because he was denied the more effective representation of his chosen
counsel.
139 Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1500; see also Caplin &Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 643.
140 Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1500-01 (pre-trial detention and bail requirements are consti-
tutional when necessary to protect public interest) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987)); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d
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ally no effect on a defendant's ability to retain counsel.
Additionally, granting Comprehensive Forfeiture Act defend-
ants the right to counsel of choice does not cause the kind of effi-
ciency problems that are caused by granting indigents the right to
counsel of choice.141 In United States v. Reckmeyer, 142 the court said,
"Subjecting attorney's fees to forfeiture is more likely to impede,
rather than advance, the orderly administration ofjustice. The for-
feiture of attorney's fees would likely cause chosen counsel to with-
draw, leading to delays, disruption of the criminal proceeding, and
further creating serious problems for already overburdened public
defenders." 143 If the government could not seize legitimate attor-
neys' fees, defendants whose assets are subject to forfeiture would
retain an attorney just as any other person with sufficient funds
would. Courts would not have to worry about all the difficulties sur-
rounding the appointment of counsel. Thus, Comprehensive For-
feiture Act defendants are sufficiently different from those indigent
due to natural circumstances, such that it is not necessary to auto-
matically deny them a right to counsel of choice.
Forfeiture defendants are also in a situation distinguishable
from other situations in which a defendant may be unable to retain
counsel because of a seizure of assets. The analogy which the
Supreme Court depended on is the bank robber's loot: courts may
freeze money alleged to be proceeds from a bank robbery even if it
was the only money with which a defendant could pay his lawyer. 44
The Supreme Court contended that allowing a defendant to use
assets allegedly obtained from racketeering or drug enterprises is
analogous to allowing a defendant to use assets allegedly obtained
from a bank robbery. 145 Several courts, however, have contended
that different interests are implicated in the two situations. In United
States v. Harvey, 146 the court explained that when the defendant is an
alleged bank robber, "the government seizes property manifestly
that of someone other than the accused and for preservative pur-
poses. Forfeiture under the Act [however] may obviously reach
637, 643 (2d Cir. 1988) (government may restrain liberty and property prior to arrest as
long as it acts within the confines of due process) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
534 (1979)).
141 See supra note 135.
142 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd, In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
143 Id. at 1196-97.
144 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653; see also Brecher, The Sixth Amendment and the
Right to Counsel, 136 U. PA. L. RaV. 1957, 1960-61 (1988).
145 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2652-53.
146 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
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property of the accused to which no third party has a superior
claim." 1
47
Judge Logan, dissenting in Nichols, stressed the legal basis of
the difference between the two claims: the assets belong to the bank
because of ancient common law property rules, not because of a
property scheme devised by the legislature as a penalty. 148 In the
bank robbery situation, the government would rather risk that an
innocent defendant will be denied the right to counsel of choice
than that many completely innocent depositors will be denied
money which could be essential to their well-being; in the case of
forfeiture, however, no innocent victim will be denied his/her sav-
ings if a defendant uses tainted assets to pay the attorney. 149
The Supreme Court rejected these distinctions because prop-
erty rights created by the relation-back clause are no different than
"pre-existing property rights."'150  The Court, however, referred
only to the general concept that criminal forfeiture is acceptable
without recognizing that the relevant period for this analysis is a
time prior to conviction when ownership of assets is unclear. In ef-
fect, as Justice Blackmun asserted in his dissenting opinion, the
147 Id. at 926.
148 United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1509-13 (Logan,J., dissenting). Judge Logan
stated:
The property lawjargon borrowed by Congress-that 'title vests' in the government
on the date the crime is committed-does not alter the essentially penal basis and
justification for the forfeiture. In my view, this distinction between the desire to
punish and the protection of legitimately pre-existing property rights demands
treating the property to which the government claims a right of forfeiture as differ-
ent from the property of competing contestants who assert claims as rightful owners
under common law property concepts.
Id. at 1511; see also Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 55-56 (title
differences are very significant because the owner of the stolen goods has title at all
times, but in forfeiture cases, title passes to the government only upon conviction).
149 Professor Winick, who wrote an amicus brief in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale for
several organizations, including the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
and the American Civil Liberties Union, explained that the bank robber analogy was
false:
The cash proceeds of a bank robbery belong to the bank or to its depositors; this is
true even in the absence of a forfeiture statute. These wrongfully deprived owners
have a common law right to the return of their property, and government has a
compelling interest in obtaining its return that plainly outweighs the robber's claim
to use it for any purpose, even to hire an attorney. Moreover, this interest simply
cannot be accomplished in any way other than the return of the property. In the
forfeiture situation, however, the government's interest in stripping the accused of
his property is not frustrated by permitting a portion of the property to be trans-
ferred to defense counsel.
Winick, supra note 7, at 814-15 (citations omitted).
150 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2653 (1989)
(There is a "long-recognized and lawful practice of vesting title to any forfeitable assets,
in the United States, at the time of the criminal act giving rise to forfeiture.").
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Court engaged in circular reasoning.151 It is true that the validity of
the relation-back clause in situations outside the attorneys' fees is-
sue has been declared valid 52 and that legislatures are generally
free to create property interests since we do not depend exclusively
on a common law property system, 153 but the Court uses the gen-
eral validity of the relation-back clause to prove that in a specific
situation which presents unique constitutional problems courts are
free to use the relation-back clause. Since a constitutional right is
involved, a broad assertion that the clause in general does not vio-
late due process rights is not conclusive. Legislatures cannot create
a property right that takes away constitutional rights. Thus, it is
necessary to consider the differences described by judges and schol-
ars and recognize that they justify treating the forfeiture defendant
differently than the alleged bank robber.154
The Court also used other cases similar to the bank robbery
situation to justify allowing forfeiture of attorneys' fees. 155 The
cases which provide the closest parallels arejeopardy tax assessment
cases. 156 The jeopardy assessment allows the IRS to "seize a tax-
payer's assets before he has an opportunity to challenge the validity
of the assessment in court."' 57  Courts that have considered
whether money should be released from the assessment when the
defendant needs it to offset the costs of either criminal or civil suits
have not required the release of funds. 58
151 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2676 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152 See id. at 2653 (citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890)).
153 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits are a matter of statu-
tory entitlement).
154 In Caplin & Drysdale, the Court claimed that if it allowed assets subject to a re-
straining order to be used for sixth amendment rights, it would have to allow assets to
be used to exercise any constitutional right. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72;
Caplin &Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2653. This analysis, however, is not accurate. The assets
are restrained for a relatively short period, and the government's interest in assuring it
can collect the assets will outweigh the defendant's need to use the assets for most other
activities during that time because the activities can be carried out at any time. The right
to counsel, however, is meaningful only during the period during which assets are
restrained.
155 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2655. It may be possible that the situations like
forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act should be found to be unconstitu-
tional, but since the situations are distinguishable there is no need to address the possi-
bility that they may be unconstitutional. The petitioners in Caplin & Drysdale conceded
that the analogous situations were constitutional. Id.
156 Kathleen Brickey gives several other examples which are simply variations onjeop-
ardy tax assessments and bank robbery situations. Brickey, supra note 7, at 770-72, cited
in Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2655 n.9.
157 Brickey, supra note 5, at 525.
158 United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1975) (a court hearing a crimi-
nal case does not have jurisdiction to order that funds be released from a jeopardy tax
assessment involving the defendant); Kelly v. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1975)
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, however, has a different
purpose than the tax statutes, and the "different purposes . . . re-
quire different procedures." 159 Tax assessments enjoy a presump-
tion of validity and are civil proceedings. 160 The criminal case for
which the defendants want money is a proceeding separate from the
assessment proceeding. 161 The IRS has substantial power to make
assessments because its purpose is to raise revenue.162 There is a
"strong congressional policy against judicial interference in the tax
collecting process."' 63 In contrast, forfeiture is a criminal penalty
for which no special governmental procedures are provided; "spe-
cial rules govern the resolution of issues in the context of assess-
ment proceedings which make them poor authority for criminal
prosecutions."' 64 Furthermore, United States v. Brodson,' 65 the case
cited most often in forfeiture cases, is "easily distinguished."'' 66
The defendant retained the counsel of his choice and wanted money
released from the assessment to pay an accountant he wanted to use
as an expert. 16
7
In Marshall, one of the few assessment cases linked to a criminal
proceeding, the court did not reach any constitutional issues be-
cause it decided that it did not have authority to enjoin a tax collec-
(court refused to consider whether any sixth amendment rights had been violated be-
cause of a jeopardy tax assessment because defendant had been represented by ap-
pointed counsel); Avco Delta Corp. Canada v. United States, 484 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1973) (release of funds to pay attorneys' fees was error in jeopardy assessment case
because right to counsel issue was decided prematurely; necessary to wait until after trial
to determine effects); Illinois Redi-Mix Corp. v. Coyle, 360 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1966)
(constitutional question decided prematurely; money cannot be released from jeopardy
tax assessment to aid in defense in civil trial); United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107
(7th Cir. 1957) (court would not release money from jeopardy tax assessment to allow
defendant to hire accountant as an expert witness; constitutional questions should only
be decided after trial); Shapiro v. Secretary of State, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) para.
9507 (D.D.C. June 22, 1976) (in a civil action, a court does not have jurisdiction to order
a release of funds from the jeopardy tax assessment).
159 Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 40 n.189.
160 Id. In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2677 n.15
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), Justice Blackmun explained:
[E]ven if ajeopardy assessment were to deprive a taxpayer of the funds necessary to
file a challenge to the assessment in the Tax Court, the proceeding in that court is
civil, and the Sixth Amendment therefore does not apply.... [T]he constitutional-
ity of a jeopardy assessment that deprived the defendant of the funds necessary to
hire counsel to ward off a criminal challenge is not to be assumed.
161 See Brodson, 241 F.2d at 108.
162 Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 40 n.189.
163 United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1975).
164 Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 40 n.189.
165 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).
166 United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1557 (D. Utah 1987).
167 Id.
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tion.168 Clearly, there is no similar problem in Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act cases. Thus, defendants who have suffered forfeiture
under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act should not be regarded as
indigents merely because defendants in jeopardy tax assessment
cases are indigents. The Court had no need to class forfeiture de-
fendants along with all other indigents who enjoy a limited right to
choice.
2. The Right to Counsel of Choice
Since forfeiture defendants are not indigents, the Court should
have carefully considered the balance between the defendants' and
the government's rights rather than quickly throwing out some weak
and poorly analyzed reasons for reaching the balance it had already
determined it had to reach. The only way to conduct an appropriate
balance is to carefully analyze the right to counsel of choice, a feat
the Court achieved without ever looking at a right to counsel of
choice case. 16 9
Powell v. State 170 introduced the concept of a right to counsel of
choice: "It is hardly necessary to say that the right to counsel being
conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to se-
cure counsel of his own choice."' 171 Since Powell, many courts have
applied the right to counsel of choice in a variety of situations.
Courts have consistently decided right to counsel of choice cases by
balancing the interests of the government and the interests of the
defendant, 172 but a balancing test means little unless courts know
how much weight the defendant's right to counsel of choice
deserves. 173
Several cases have hinted at the purpose of the right to counsel
168 United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1975).
169 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652 (1989). The
Court used Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988), to support its view of the right
to counsel of choice; but although right to counsel of choice was relevant to the case,
Wheat primarily concerns the right to conflict-free counsel. The right to counsel of
choice has a long history which the Court ignored.
170 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
171 Id. at 53.
172 See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir. 1986).
173 In the relatively simple situation of defendants asking for a continuance so that
counsel of their choice can appear, courts have decided similar cases inconsistently be-
cause the importance of the right to counsel of choice is unclear. Some claim the contin-
uance is valid as long as the request is for a moderate delay and for legitimate reasons.
See, e.g., Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981) (trial court erred in refusing
to grant continuance when first counsel withdrew because of scheduling conflicts and
new counsel had only ten days to prepare for trial). Others consider only the necessity
of a speedy trial. See, e.g., United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11 th Cir. 1986)
(refusal to grant continuance justified when case had been continued several times
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of choice and the weight due the right. In Linton v. Perini,174 the
only case to directly explain a purpose, the court said that the right
to counsel of choice ensures that there will be a certain level of con-
fidence between the attorney and the client. Other cases implicitly
support this purpose. For example, in Morris v. Slappy, 175 Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, recognized that a meaningful at-
torney-client relationship is the crucial element in the right to coun-
sel of choice. Morris concerned an indigent defendant who tried to
obtain a continuance by claiming that he needed a continuance to
ensure a "meaningful attorney-client relationship."'' 76 The Court
decided that there was no such thing as the right to a "meaningful
attorney-client relationship,"'' 77 but Justice Brennan argued that ac-
ceptance of this right did not mean courts would be inquiring into
the quality of a relationship; it simply meant courts should be willing
to grant continuances in order to allow a defendant to be repre-
sented by one attorney throughout the case.
178
Professor Winick explained in some depth the value of the right
to counsel of choice at which the courts hint:
Allowing the defendant free choice in the critical matter of who will
represent him at trial fosters both the reliability of the outcome and
values unrelated to truth determination. Thus the right to counsel of
choice is critical to the basic trust between counsel and client that is a
cornerstone of the adversary system. This basic trust, indispensable to
an effective attorney-client relationship, both increases the reliability
of the trial and serves a crucial participatory function, "generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been
done." . . . A crucial aspect of the participatory and autonomy values
served by the right to counsel of choice is the selection and employ-
ment of the advocate who will assert the defendant's legal rights. 179
Although the value of ensuring a right to counsel of choice in
before and defendant wanted another continuance when two lawyers had a trial that
went longer than they expected).
174 656 F.2d 207, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1981).
175 461 U.S. 1, 19-25 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring).
176 It appears that the defendant couched his claim in this language rather than in
terms of the right to counsel of choice simply because he was indigent and knew indi-
gents could not make right to counsel of choice claims.
177 Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14. This aspect of the decision was mere dictum because the
Court decided the defendant had not raised this claim at trial; he had asked for a contin-
uance only on the basis that his attorney had not had adequate time to prepare. Id. at
13. Furthermore, the Court's discussion of the right to a meaningful attorney-client
relationship may apply only to indigent defendants and it does not require that courts
refuse to recognize obtaining a meaningful attorney-client relationship as a rationale
behind recognizing a right to counsel of choice.
178 Id. at 25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
179 Winick, supra note 7, at 802-03 (quotingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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order to encourage a relationship of trust and confidence is evident,
a recent Supreme Court case, Wheat v. United States,' 80 suggests that
the right to counsel of choice is little more than another name for
effective assistance of counsel and that the right to counsel of choice
is insignificant. Neither of these beliefs, however, is necessarily
accurate.
In Wheat, the defendant claimed that the right to counsel of
choice allowed him to have the same attorney as two of his co-
defendants.' 8 ' All of the defendants were willing to waive their
right to conflict-free representation in order to allow the defendant
to use their attorney.8 2 The chance that any conflicts of interest
would arise was quite remote, according to the defendant.
83
The statement that could cause the equating of the right to
counsel of choice and the right to effective assistance of counsel is
"the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an ef-
fective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure
that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom
he prefers."'18 4 If this view is correct, there would be no explanation
for the development of the right to counsel of choice. However, two
distinct rights have developed.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is usually applied
subsequent to a trial, and in order to claim this right a defendant
must demonstrate that his/her counsel was incompetent.' 85 The
right to counsel of choice, however, applies at the beginning of a
180 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
181 Id. at 156-57.
182 Id. at 157.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 159. Other courts have made similar claims. See United States v. Ely, 719
F.2d 902, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1037 (1984); Burgos v. Murphy,
692 F. Supp. 1571, 1575 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Both of these cases concern the right of indi-
gents to counsel of choice, so the view in these cases does not necessarily represent all
considerations pertinent to the counsel of choice.
185 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court devel-
oped a two prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel cases: I) the defendant must
show "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment," and 2) "the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." This test addresses
individual incidents of improper conduct rather than the adequacy of a provision such as
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. No matter how bad the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act may be, it will not cause consistent violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, the Court recognized that situations exist where
prejudice can be presumed and where one does not have to identify specific acts of
incompetence. Violations of the right to counsel of choice fall into this category. Cloud,
Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 42; Note, supra note 7, at 677. Further-
more, the right to counsel of choice applies when the defendant complains at the begin-
ning of trial, as occurs in Comprehensive Forfeiture Act cases, rather than after trial is
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trial and provides a means for courts to ensure that the defendant
has a lawyer whom he/she can trust and with whom he/she can
work. Without a good relationship, a defendant may not receive ef-
fective representation even though no outward signs would demon-
strate the deficiencies.'
86
Wheat does not disprove that this crucial distinction between
right to counsel of choice and right to effective assistance of counsel
exists. The Court correctly stated that the basis of all right to coun-
sel considerations is that all defendants should receive effective
assistance of counsel. What the Court left unstated, but in no way
denied, is that there are many means of ensuring effective assistance
of counsel, and one way is to make sure defendants have attorneys
in whom they can trust and confide. In Wheat, the Court left this
unstated because the defendant was deprived only of one lawyer for
good reason and still could retain any other lawyer. In forfeiture
cases, the situation is much more serious and the problem of main-
taining a confidential and trusting relationship cannot be overstated
because instead of being denied one attorneys' services, a forfeiture
defendant is completely denied the opportunity to select counsel.1
8 7
The second suggestion in Wheat is its indication that the right to
counsel of choice is insignificant. The Court's holding in Wheat,
however, is not inconsistent with giving the right to counsel of
choice a high value; Wheat simply indicates that the right to conflict-
free counsel, a right intimately related to the right to effective assist-
ance of counsel, is more important. 188 Such a priority is logical be-
finished and one can pick out the incompetent acts. Note, Wilson v. Mintzes: A Case of
Ineffective Assistance or Denial of Counsel of Choice?, 17 TOLEDO L. REv. 615, 630 (1986).
186 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2674 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denial of right to counsel of choice in forfeiture setting will
cause defendant to distrust his appointed counsel and feel that counsel was imposed
upon him as a punishment); Morris, 461 U.S. at 21 (Brennan,J., concurring) (uninhibited
communications between lawyer and client are necessary, and lawyer and client must be
able to work together to make crucial decisions). Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275 (6th
Cir. 1985), illustrates the possibility that counsel may not be effective even though a
defendant has no hope of fulfilling the Strickland requirements. The court initially tried
Wilson as a right to effective assistance of counsel case, id. at 277, but the court decided it
could not require a dissatisfied client to show severe incompetence to obtain the right to
get a new lawyer: "Application of the two-prong Strickland test to motions for substitu-
tion of counsel would require a defendant who cannot communicate with counsel, who
is dissatisfied with counsel or whose defense is burdened by a conflict of interest to
prove that counsel's conduct rises to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness." Id. at
283 (citations omitted).
187 See Winick, supra note 7, at 800.
188 See id. at 810 (citations omitted):
[T]he Court's holding in Wheat-that a defendant could not choose representation
by an attorney found to be subject to an actual conflict of interest-does not 'en-
compass' the discrete question of whether the government may deprive a defendant
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cause many lawyers equally competent to the lawyer the defendant
had chosen were available, and only one lawyer presented conflict of
interest problems. Consequently, the Court's decision avoided all
conflict of interest problems but had minimal effect on the defend-
ant's ability to find an attorney in whom he/she had confidence.
Furthermore, courts have stressed that Wheat leaves in place the pre-
sumption in favor of right to counsel of choice.189
Several circuit court cases on the right to counsel of choice
show that there are strong arguments for the right to counsel of
choice which were irrelevant in Wheat.
In United States v. Diozzi, 190 the prosecution wanted to call the
defendants' lawyers as witnesses. The court refused to allow the
prosecution to call these lawyers because doing so would create a
conflict of interest and would deprive the defendants of their coun-
sel of choice. 19 1 The court warned "that disqualification of defense
counsel should be a measure of last resort .... In moving to dis-
qualify appellants' chosen counsel, the government bears a heavy
burden of establishing that disqualification is justified."' 192
In United States v. Romano, 193 the court similarly favored a strong
right to counsel of choice. The'district court judge told the defend-
ant that if she wanted to proceed pro se, he would appoint stand-by
counsel and then if he later denied herpro se status, stand-by counsel
would represent her.194 During the trial, the judge denied the de-
fendant's pro se status based on her inappropriate conduct, and the
defendant then wanted to retain counsel to take over her defense.
The court, however, required her to use the appointed stand-by
counsel. Besides claiming that the defendant had to use the ap-
pointed counsel because of court procedures, the judge claimed that
the defendant's chosen counsel would likely cause the same disrup-
tions that the defendant had caused. 195
On appeal, the court reversed and vehemently opposed the
idea that the trial court could interfere with the defendant's right to
counsel of choice merely because the defendant's retained counsel
of the opportunity to select any private counsel, let alone one subject to a disquali-
fying condition such as conflict of interest.
189 United States ex rel Stewart on Behalf of Tineo v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Alamo, 872 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1989).
190 807 F.2d 10 (Ist Cir. 1986).
191 Id. at 12.
192 Id.
193 849 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1988).
194 Id. at 818.
195 Id. at 819.
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might act improperly.1 96 The court needed proof that such im-
proper behavior would occur because the right to counsel of choice
is "fundamental."'
9 7
In United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 198 the court also endorsed as
fundamental the right to counsel of choice and decided that the
right to counsel of choice cannot be denied merely because of a stat-
ute which prevented attorneys not licensed to practice law in Puerto
Rico from trying more than one case in Puerto Rico per year.' 99
The defendant was involved in two trials and wanted a certain law-
yer to represent him in both.
In overturning the statute, the court recognized that legisla-
tures may regulate the attorneys who appear before the court.
200
The court, however, went on to state:
The right to counsel of choice cannot be denied without a showing
that the exercise of that right would interfere with the fair, orderly and
expeditious administration ofjustice. The mere fact that a defendant
seeks to retain an out-of-state attorney does not hinder the efficacious
administration of justice.
20 1
According to the court, the right to counsel of choice is an estab-
lished one which legislatures must carefully consider when regulat-
ing the court system.
Thus, the right to counsel of choice deserves a great deal of
weight because it assures a fair trial by giving defendants an oppor-
tunity to find a lawyer in whom they have confidence and with whom
they can cooperate. No defendant could hope to present a success-
ful defense absent attorney-client communication.
Courts must balance this right to counsel of choice and the gov-
ernment's interest in obtaining forfeiture of attorneys' fees. The
government interests at stake in most right to counsel of choice
cases are the efficient functioning of the case and the avoidance of
conflicts of interest.20 2 In cases under the Comprehensive Forfei-
ture Act, however, allowing defendants to exercise their right to
counsel of choice could increase efficiency.203 Thus, the balancing
196 Id. at 820.
197 Id.
198 816 F.2d 813 (Ist Cir. 1987).
199 Id. at 817-18.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (Court cannot reconcile right
to conflict-free counsel and right to counsel of choice, so it denied right to counsel of
choice); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 141-43; United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), cited in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2667, 2675 (1989) (BlackmunJ., dissenting). In Badalamenti, the court
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in forfeiture cases is unique, and the Court had little direction other
than the cases described above indicating that the right to counsel
of choice deserves considerable respect.
However, not only did the court fail to refer to any of these
cases that indicate the need to respect the right to counsel of choice,
the Court invented governmental interests which were not intended
by Congress. In fact, these interests have little foundation other
than the fertile imaginations of the Justices of the Court.
The Court invented three interests. 204 First, the Court claimed
that the government should "recover[] all forfeitable assets, for such
assets are deposited in a Fund.that supports law-enforcement efforts
in a variety of important and useful ways." 20 5 Justice Blackmun
pointed out that the government can claim no such interest because
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act was clearly meant as a penal stat-
ute, not as a revenue raising statute.206 Furthermore, "the appear-
ance ofjustice requires an end to the Assets Forfeiture Fund, which
gives the United States Attorney ... a budgetary stake in the vindi-
cation of the government's claim to the property."
20 7
Second, the Court said that the assets of the defendant must go
to "those wrongfully deprived or defrauded of [them]." 208 This
claim is completely acceptable because the assets in question are the
ones analogous to the bank robber's loot; third parties never relin-
quished title to certain assets, so they must be returned and this
claim supercedes the attorney's. Nonetheless, the reason forfeiture
raises a problem is that the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act allows
explained that denying the right to counsel of choice in forfeiture cases creates forfeit-
ures rather than avoiding them:
A lawyer who was so foolish, ignorant, beholden or idealistic as to take the business
would find himself in inevitable positions of conflict. His obligation to be well in-
formed on the subject of his client's case would conflict with his interest in not
learning facts that would endanger his fee by telling him his fee was the proceeds of
illegal activity. If he made efforts to fight the forfeiture claiming he was "reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture," the evidence
on this issue would consist primarily of privileged matter confided to him by his
client. He might furthermore be found to have accepted a contingent fee in a crimi-
nal case in violation of DR 2-106(C), since his retention of his fee would depend on
gaining an acquittal in the client's trial. The statute would give attorneys a motive
to negotiate a guilty plea that did not involve forfeiture, rather than fight the case
expending valuable time and increasing the risk of incurring forfeiture.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 75-79; Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654-55.
205 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654.
206 Id. at 2670 & n.6 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182).
207 Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 334
(1988).
208 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2654.
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the government to seek forfeiture of a wide variety of assets, 20 9 and
for most of the assets there will be no one to whom to return the
money. The Court cannot be suggesting that everyone who bought
drugs from the defendants in these cases should have the money
spent on illegal drug purchases returned to them.
The third governmental interest recognized by the Court is the
most troublesome; the Court said that when Congress referred to
depriving defendants of "economic power," it included "the use of
such economic power to retain private counsel." 2 10 The Court
claimed that this interest does not interfere with sixth amendment
rights because a defendant cannot use proceeds of the crime to re-
tain counsel.2 1' This justification is unacceptable for two reasons:
first, because, in effect, it suggests that prosecutors have a right to
make sure they do not have to face the best criminal defense lawyers
and, second, because it suggests that, at the time when the defend-
ant must exercise right to counsel of choice, it is clear that the assets
belong to the government. Justice Blackmun was alarmed by the
possibility that the government could base the legitimacy of forfei-
ture on a desire to make sure a defendant did not get the best repre-
sentation potentially available to him; he found this interest to be
clearly illegitimate.
212
If the Supreme Court had considered the intentions of Con-
gress, it would have been clear that the Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act serves three major governmental interests. 2 13 Two of the gov-
ernmental interests are explicitly referred to in the legislative his-
tory, and the third is a purpose of all penal statutes: 1) the
defendant must not "avoid the economic impact of forfeiture," 214 2)
defendants must give up their "economic power bases," 215 and 3)
209 21 U.S.C. § 853(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
210 Caplin & Drysdale, 109 S. Ct. at 2655.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 2676 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); see also infra text accompanying notes 221-24.
213 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 924 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, In re Forfeiture
Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (1988), aft'd, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
214 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182. The committee discussed why avoidance of forfeiture was a major
concern:
[P]resent criminal forfeiture statutes do not adequately address the serious problem
of a defendant's pretrial disposition of his assets. Changes are necessary both to
preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for criminal forfeiture, and, in those
cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to assure that he
cannot as a result avoid the economic impact of forfeiture.
Id.
215 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182. The committee said:
More than ten years ago, the Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes spe-
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the government needs to deter potential racketeers and drug
dealers. 21
6
Allowing the exemption of attorneys' fees from forfeiture
would not interfere with these interests. 2 17 First, defendants who
are convicted under RICO or CCE and who are forced to forfeit all
their assets will feel an equal impact whether or not they use part of
those assets to pay their attorneys. Even if all of the assets go to-
wards attorneys' fees, the defendants will not have any assets to en-
joy. The only difference is that the lawyer instead of the
government gets the money. Since forfeiture is not intended to
raise revenue,218 the loss of money does not interfere with the gov-
ernment's interests.
Second, for substantially the same reasons, the defendant will
not have an economic power base whether or not the attorney col-
lects his fees. Courts will carefully regulate all fees paid to the attor-
ney and no sham transfers will be allowed. 219 Fees are not difficult
to regulate; consequently this government interest is hardly signifi-
cant enough to override the defendant's right to counsel of choice.
Third, the only interest that presents any difficulty is the gov-
ernment's interest in deterrence. Potential criminals may fear crime
more if they know they will not have access to an attorney whom
they trust and who may not have resources which could be very
helpful in a long, complex trial. Of course, potential criminals
cifically addressing organized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of individ-
ual racketeers and drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the
economic power bases of criminal organizations or enterprises were left intact, and
so included forfeiture authority designed to strip these offenders and organizations
of their economic power.
Id. (citation omitted).
216 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 924.
217 See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Feinberg, CJ., concurring), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989), in which the court stated:
The suggested governmental interests that are served by restraining, and permit-
ting the ultimate forfeiture of assets that are needed to pay attorney's fees are not.
all that compelling. The government's interests are that assets it seeks to obtain not
be dissipated in the relatively brief period from indictment to possible conviction
and that an alleged criminal not be able to use his economic power obtained from
illegal activities. As to the former, the government's claim to the disputed assets at
the time of restraint is only conditional, since under the CFA the government's
ownership interest in the'assets is not determined until the outcome of the criminal
prosecution. This is not to say that the government has no claim to these assets at
all, but only that the claim is not sufficiently strong to prevent those assets from
being spent on an accused's defense when the accused has no other funds available.
218 Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees, supra note 7, at 40 n. 189. Cloud said, "The
criminal forfeiture statutes ... are designed to punish criminal activity," and he con-
trasted this with the Internal Revenue Code which should be treated differently because
it exists only to raise revenues. Id.
219 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 927 (bona fide purchaser requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)
(6)(B), establishes that only legitimate fees could be exempted).
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would be even more deterred if they were not allowed any represen-
tation at all, but clearly the sixth amendment would invalidate such
an act. 220 Similarly, in this case, the Court cannot give the prosecu-
tion every opportunity it might be able to use to deter criminals. 22'
In United States v. Thier,222 the court explained that regarding the
ability to secure good counsel as an incentive to crime does not
make sense:
Expenditures the defendant must make to keep himself and his depen-
dents alive and to secure competent counsel to prove his innocence or
protect his procedural rights should not be considered incentives to
crime. The notion that a defendant would commit criminal acts to ac-
cumulate monies or property in order to pay for necessary food, cloth-
ing and shelter while he is being tried or in order to pay a reasonable
fee to the attorney he chooses to assist in his defense is sophistry.223
Since the right to counsel of choice is a significant right which
courts must recognize when no equally strong interests are pres-
ent,2 2 4 the forfeiture of attorneys' fees is unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
In Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court adopted
a strong stance against allowing exemption of attorneys' fees from
forfeiture. Its emphasis on the mandatory language in the statute
leaves courts no room to avoid the harsh result of forfeiture, and the
uncompromising approach to the right to counsel of choice leaves
no room for defendants to challenge the statute on any sixth amend-
ment ground.
The implications of these decisions could be far reaching both
because prosecutors now have little reason not to seek forfeiture of
everything including attorneys' fees and because the opinions seem
to encourage the adoption of forfeiture penalties for many other
crimes. Also, the decisions could have an adverse effect on cases in
which a defendant relies on right to counsel of choice simply to seek
a continuance in a case. These cases, combined with Wheat and Mor-
ris, indicate that right to counsel of choice is of minimal significance.
It is frightening that the Court is placing more and more emphasis
220 Powell v. State, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
221 United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1403 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Fein-
berg, C.J., concurring) ("[W]eakening the ability of an accused to defend himself at trial
is an advantage for the government. But it is not a legitimate government interest that
can be used to justify invasion of a constitutional right.").
222 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986).
223 Id. at 1474-75.
224 See supra notes 170-203 and accompanying text.
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on the right to effective assistance of counsel, which is almost im-
possible to prove.
One route of challenge to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees is still
open. The Court reserved the fifth amendment issue of whether an
immediate post-restraint hearing is necessary in which the govern-
ment would have to prove that it had probable cause to believe the
property was subject to forfeiture. 225 In some recent cases, courts
have held that although there is no violation of the right to counsel
of choice, a defendant should not be deprived of this right unless
there has been an adversary hearing.226 The Court may solve this
problem simply by requiring a hearing, but it could also declare the
statute unconstitutional and leave it for Congress to fix before it can
be used against attorneys' fees.
227
Depending on a ruling on the fifth amendment issue, however,
is not the best way to assure defendants will be able to exercise their
right to counsel. Instead, Congress should amend the Comprehen-
sive Forfeiture Act. Such an amendment would not be difficult.
Congress would simply have to include in the definition of a bona
fide purchaser a lawyer who does not engage in sham or fraudulent
transactions.
MELINDA HARDY
225 United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 2657, 2666 n.10 (1989).
226 United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 731 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3221 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d
1400 (2d Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 2657 (1989).
227 United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1411-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Miner, J., concurring), rev'd, 109 U.S. 2657 (1989).
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